

STATE OF WISCONSIN Division of Hearings and Appeals

In the Matter of Office of the Inspector General, Petitioner	
Pursuant to petition filed December 5, 2014, under Wis. review a decision by the Office of the Inspector General to benefits (FS) one year, a hearing was held on Tuesday, Janu	disqualify from receiving FoodShare
The issue for determination is whether the respondent comm	nitted an Intentional Program Violation (IPV).
There appeared at that time the following persons:	
PARTIES IN INTEREST: Petitioner:	
Office of the Inspector General Department of Health Services - OIG PO Box 309 Madison, WI 53701	
Respondent:	
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE: Debra Bursinger Division of Hearings and Appeals	

FINDINGS OF FACT

- 1. The respondent (CARES # Description of Outagamie County who received FS benefits in Outagamie County from September 11, 2009 through October 12, 2014.
- 2. On October 11, 2014, the respondent exhausted the remaining balance on her FS card.

- 3. On October 12, 2014, the respondent's facebook page had a post as follows: "Lookin to buy some stamps . . . hmu." A response to the post followed: "gul stop I lost that title when MY food stamps got suspended."
- 4. On December 10, 2014, the petitioner prepared an Administrative Disqualification Hearing Notice alleging that respondent attempted to buy FS benefits via social media on October 12, 2014.

DISCUSSION

An intentional program violation of the FoodShare program occurs when a recipient intentionally does the following:

- 1. makes a false or misleading statement, or misrepresents, conceals or withholds facts; or
- 2. commits any act that constitutes a violation of the Food Stamp Act, the Food Stamp Program Regulations, or any Wisconsin statute for the purpose of using, presenting, transferring, acquiring, receiving, possessing or trafficking of FoodShare benefits or QUEST cards.

FoodShare Wisconsin Handbook, § 3.14.1; see also 7 C.F.R. § 273.16(c) and Wis. Stat. §§ 946.92(2).

An intentional program violation can be proven by a court order, a diversion agreement entered into with the local district attorney, a waiver of a right to a hearing, or an administrative disqualification hearing, *FoodShare Wisconsin Handbook*, § 3.14.1. The petitioner can disqualify only the individual found to have committed the intentional violation; it cannot disqualify the entire household. Those disqualified on grounds involving the improper transfer of FS benefits are ineligible to participate in the FoodShare program for one year for the first violation, two years for the second violation, and permanently for the third violation. Although other family members cannot be disqualified, their monthly allotments will be reduced unless they agree to make restitution within 30 days of the date that the FS program mails a written demand letter. 7 C.F.R. § 273.16(b).

In order for the petitioner to establish that an FS recipient has committed an IPV, it has the burden to prove two separate elements by clear and convincing evidence. The recipient must have: 1) committed; and 2) intended to commit a program violation per 7 C.F.R. § 273.16(e)(6). In *Kuehn v. Kuehn*, 11 Wis.2d 15 (1959), the court held that:

Defined in terms of quantity of proof, reasonable certitude or reasonable certainty in ordinary civil cases may be attained by or be based on a mere or fair preponderance of the evidence. Such certainty need not necessarily exclude the probability that the contrary conclusion may be true. In fraud cases it has been stated the preponderance of the evidence should be clear and satisfactory to indicate or sustain a greater degree of certitude. Such degree of certitude has also been defined as being produced by clear, satisfactory, and convincing evidence. Such evidence, however, need not eliminate a reasonable doubt that the alternative or opposite conclusion may be true. ...

Kuehn, 11 Wis.2d at 26.

Wisconsin Jury Instruction – Civil 205 is also instructive. It provides:

Clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence is evidence which when weighed against that opposed to it clearly has more convincing power. It is evidence which satisfies and convinces you that "yes" should be the answer because of its greater weight and clear convincing power. "Reasonable certainty" means that you are persuaded based upon a rational consideration of the evidence. Absolute certainty is not required, but a guess is not enough to meet the burden of proof. This burden of proof is known as the "middle burden." The evidence required to meet this

burden of proof must be more convincing than merely the greater weight of the credible evidence but may be less than beyond a reasonable doubt.

Further, the *McCormick* treatise states that "it has been persuasively suggested that [the clear and convincing evidence standard of proof] could be more simply and intelligibly translated to the jury if they were instructed that they must be persuaded that the truth of the contention is highly probable." 2 *McCormick on Evidence* § 340 (John W. Strong gen. ed., 4th ed. 1992.

Thus, in order to find that an IPV was committed, the trier of fact must derive from the evidence a firm conviction as to the existence of each of the two elements even though there may be a reasonable doubt as to their existence.

In order to prove the second element, i.e., intention, there must be clear and convincing evidence that the FS recipient intended to commit the IPV. The question of intent is generally one to be determined by the trier of fact. *State v. Lossman*, 118 Wis.2d 526 (1984). There is a general rule that a person is presumed to know and intend the probable and natural consequences of his or her own voluntary words or acts. *See, John F. Jelke Co. v. Beck*, 208 Wis. 650 (1932); 31A C.J.S. Evidence §131. Intention is a subjective state of mind to be determined upon all the facts. *Lecus v. American Mut. Ins. Co. of Boston*, 81 Wis.2d 183 (1977). Thus, there must be clear and convincing evidence that the FS recipient knew that the act or omission was a violation of the FS Program but committed the violation anyway.

This case deals with an allegation of trafficking. Under 7 CFR §271.2, trafficking means:

- (1) The buying, stelling, stealing, or otherwise effecting an exchange of SNAP benefits issued and accessed via Electronic Benefit Transfer (EBT) cards, card numbers and personal identification numbers (PINs), or by manual voucher and signature, for cash or consideration other than eligible food, either directly, indirectly, in complicity or collusion with others, or acting alone;
- (2) The exchange of firearms, ammunition, explosives, or controlled substances, as defined in section 802 of title 21, United States Code, for SNAP benefits;
- (3) Purchasing a product with SNAP benefits that has a container requiring a return deposit with the intent of obtaining cash by discarding the product and returning the container for the deposit amount, intentionally discarding the product, and intentionally returning the container for the deposit amount;
- (4) Purchasing a product with SNAP benefits with the intent of obtaining cash or consideration other than eligible food by reselling the product, and subsequently intentionally reselling the product purchased with SNAP benefits in exchange for cash or consideration other than eligible food; or
- (5) Intentionally purchasing products originally purchased with SNAP benefits in exchange for cash or consideration other than eligible food.
- (6) Attempting to buy, sell, steal, or otherwise affect an exchange of SNAP benefits issued and accessed via Electronic Benefit Transfer (EBT) cards, card numbers and personal identification numbers (PINs), or by manual voucher and signatures, for cash or consideration other than eligible food, either directly, indirectly, in complicity or collusion with others, or acting alone.

This definition became effective November 19, 2013.1 The previous definition of trafficking did not include attempted trafficking in (6).

The Federal Registrar, addressing the amendment to the trafficking definition, indicates that "attempt" consists of the "intent to do an act, an overt action beyond mere preparation, and the failure to complete the act."

The OIG argues that there is clear and convincing evidence that the respondent committed an intentional program violation when she attempted to buy FS on social media in violation of the federal regulations.

The post on the respondent's account states: "Lookin to buy some stamps . . . hmu." HMU is social media slang for "hit me up." The agency asserts that the post is an attempt to purchase FS benefits.

The respondent did not dispute that this was her account. She also did not dispute that the post was an attempt to buy food stamps, as evidence by the response which specifically refers to food stamps. She testified that she did not write the post because her account was hacked or used by someone who picked up her phone. The respondent stated that she could present evidence to demonstrate that she changed her facebook password after she discovered the account was hacked. The record was held open to allow the respondent to present evidence that she changed passwords or other evidence that her account had been hacked. No additional evidence was submitted by the respondent.

I do not find the respondent's testimony to be credible. She presented no evidence that her account was hacked or that she changed her password after discovering the account had been hacked. It is also not credible that someone else would look for FS benefits using her account. The respondent was given the opportunity to present evidence to show that her account had been hacked or that she had changed her password in response to it being hacked but provided no additional evidence.

Regarding whether the post constitutes trafficking, I conclude there is sufficient evidence to find that the respondent had formed an intent to purchase FS benefits and took overt action to complete that act. Specifically, the language in the post clearly demonstrates that she had formed an intent. In addition, the acts of going onto the computer or her phone, signing in to her account, creating a post to buy FS and posting it are overt actions beyond mere preparation to commit the act of attempting to buy FS benefits.

Based upon the record before me, I find that the petitioner has established by clear and convincing evidence that the respondent intentionally violated FS program rules, and that this violation was the first such violation committed by the respondent. Therefore, the petitioner correctly seeks to disqualify the respondent from the FS program for one year.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

- 1. The respondent violated, and intended to violate, the FS program rule specifying that the attempt to buy or sell FS benefits for cash or consideration is prohibited.
- 2. The violation specified in Conclusion of Law No. 1 is the first such violation committed by the respondent.

¹ https://www.federalregister.gov/articles/2013/08/21/2013-20245/supplemental-nutrition-assistance-program-trafficking-controls-and-fraud-investigations

² See https://www.federalregister.gov/articles/2013/08/21/2013-20245/supplemental-nutrition-assistance-program-trafficking-controls-and-fraud-investigations#h-13

NOW, THEREFORE, it is

ORDERED

That the petitioner's determination is sustained, and that the petitioner may make a finding that the respondent committed a first IPV of the FoodShare program and disqualify the respondent from the program for one year, effective the first month following the date of receipt of this decision.

REQUEST FOR A REHEARING ON GROUNDS OF GOOD CAUSE FOR FAILURE TO APPEAR

In instances where the good cause for failure to appear is based upon a showing of non-receipt of the hearing notice, the respondent has 30 days after the date of the written notice of the hearing decision to claim good cause for failure to appear. See 7 C.F.R. sec. 273.16(e)(4). Such a claim should be made in writing to the Division of Hearings and Appeals, P.O. Box 7875, Madison, WI 53707-7875.

APPEAL TO COURT

You may also appeal this decision to Circuit Court in the county where you live. Appeals must be filed with the Court **and** served either personally or by certified mail on the Secretary of the Department of Health Services, 1 West Wilson Street, Room 651, Madison, WI 53703, **and** on those identified in this decision as "PARTIES IN INTEREST" **no more than 30 days after the date of this decision** or 30 days after a denial of a timely rehearing request (if you request one).

The process for Circuit Court Appeals may be found at Wis. Stat. §§ 227.52 and 227.53. A copy of the statutes may be found online or at your local library or courthouse.

Given under my hand at the City of Milwaukee, Wisconsin, this 12th day of February, 2015

\sDebra Bursinger
Administrative Law Judge
Division of Hearings and Appeals

c: Office of the Inspector General - email
 Public Assistance Collection Unit - email
 Division of Health Care Access and Accountability - email
 Nicole Housley - email



State of Wisconsin\DIVISION OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS

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The preceding decision was sent to the following parties on February 12, 2015.

Office of the Inspector General Public Assistance Collection Unit Division of Health Care Access and Accountability nicolel.housley@wisconsin.gov